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Abstract 
It is unanimously agreed that currency policies of the countries, particularly their exchange-rate 
values, have a significant impact on trade as it alters exports and imports between one country 
and its trading partners. In spite of this, the rules of currency seem to be absent in World Trade 
Organization (WTO) framework. 
The main purpose of this paper is to analyse the reasoning why such important rules are missing 
out in the multilateral trade sphere. It is divided into few sections; the first one examines 
currency manipulation and the significance of it for international trade, the second one analyses 
the existence of institutional gap between WTO and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 
addressing the problem of currency manipulation, the third explains the reinforcement of status 
quo at multilateral sphere based on neorealism framework, and the last one will provide some 
insight on the possibility of inclusion of currency chapter at free-trade agreement level. 
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Introduction 
Following the recovery of global financial crisis, many countries have resorted to use currency-
related trade measures to gain competitiveness for their products and subsequently boost their 
exports and economic growth. China, with its boosted exports, is regarded as the most 
prominent currency manipulator, which mostly hurt US markets. Mattoo and Subramanian 
(2008) depicted that China’s exchange rate undervaluation is ranging from 20-60% during the 
period 2000-07, indicating a manipulation of a great extent. Globally, currency manipulation is 
argued to have distorted capital flows by US$1.5 trillion every year (Gagnon 2012). 
According to standard economic theory, it is undeniable that currency manipulation significantly 
affects trade among nations, both directly and indirectly. A question then arises on why the rules 
on currency-related trade policies are absent in World Trade Organization (WTO) framework. It is 
such an irony given WTO has extensive rules on property rights and foreign investment which 
only have indirect effects to trade. Furthermore, even inconclusive Doha Round focuses more on 
agriculture and does not have a tendency to focus on currency-related trade measures. 
This paper attempts to analyse the underlying reasons why currency policies are absent in WTO 
framework and contends that the main reason is due to institutional discrepancies between 
WTO and International Monetary Fund (IMF). There is reason to believe that the future inclusion 
of currency chapter in WTO will remain unlikely. Nonetheless, there is possibility of rules of 
currencies to be included in free-trade agreements, on the condition that gains from trading 
without currency manipulation are greater than gains from trading with manipulation. 
This essay first looks at the mechanism on why the countries resort to currency manipulation 
and how such policies affect international trade. It then explains the exclusion of currency-
related trade measures in WTO. The last discussion explores the reinforcement of status quo 
with regard to currency rules in WTO as well as the possibility of inclusion in trade agreements 
based on neo-realism framework on international governance. 
Currency Manipulation and Free-Trade 
According to Gagnon (2012), currency manipulation happens when a government “buys or sells 
foreign currency to push the exchange rate of its currency away from its equilibrium value or to 
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prevent the exchange rate from moving toward its equilibrium value.” By this definition, 
government manipulates currency for not only boosting exports, but also other purposes such as 
stabilising exchange rates or managing inflation. 
Laffer (2014) illustrated how currency devaluation will not only affect export but also 
employment in domestic economy. First, continued depreciation of real exchange rate will 
increase country’s producers’ competitiveness at international scale thereby boosting their 
exports. The producers will then use this revenue to diversify their goods and invest in large-
scale production. At the same time, currency devaluation will cause domestic consumers to 
import less foreign goods, as they are now relatively expensive and in turn, they resort to local 
products. Increased demand for local products means that domestic employment will rise. In 
contrast, other things equal, employment level in its trading partners will fall. Thus, currency 
devaluation is regarded as beggar-thy-neighbour policies (i.e. gain by one country and loss for its 
trading partners). Nonetheless, this is politically appealing at national level, but at international 
level, concern will arise as countries would not want to be in the ‘losers’ position. 
With reference to trade policies, since currency manipulation  makes price of country’s exports 
lower and price of its imports higher, it is equal to simultaneous export subsidy and import tariff, 
therefore it is the most protectionist policy in direct means (Bergsten 2014; Waibel 2010; 
Mattoo and Subramanian 2008). Nonetheless, other things equal, it does not affect global trade 
volume as it only distorts trade from one country to another. That is why somehow currency 
policies have been missing out from the trade discussion (Bergsten 2014). 
Hypothetically, countries with export-led growth strategy (i.e. rely heavily on exports) view 
depreciation of their currencies as a good thing, thus there is a possibility that they will 
manipulate their exchange rate to a certain degree. This hypothesis is confirmed by Gagnon 
(2012) finding, which identified extreme currency manipulators over the past decade. It is found 
that currency manipulators are quite diverse in terms of their level of economic development. 
However, there are four groups of countries in general, which shares characteristics of great 
reliance on exports (1) advanced economies such as Japan; (2) newly industrialised countries 
such as Israel, Singapore, and Taiwan; (3) emerging Asian economies such as China, Malaysia, 
and Thailand; and (4) oil export-countries such as Algeria, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. Asian 
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economies dominate the positions as currency manipulators; the plausible reason is that 
exporters in these countries are politically powerful in lobbying to resort for competitive 
devaluation, also, maintaining current account surplus is seen as ‘convenient way’ to maintain 
steady growth (Gagnon 2012). If all currency manipulation is valued at US dollars, the extent of 
impact for such manipulation is that US current account would have been pushed down by 4% of 
its GDP (Gagnon 2012); indicating a huge impacts for global trade and economy. 
There is almost unanimous agreement that China is regarded as the greatest currency 
manipulator and its currency manipulation hurts not only advanced economies, particularly US, 
but also its Asian export-rivals. It has been studied extensively and the findings in 2009-2010 
seemed to report that China has undervalued its currency by as high as 50% of its original rate 
with respect to US dollar (Throstensen, Marçal and Ferraz 2011). Throstensen et. al. (2011) 
shows the significance of this undervaluation in the form of tariffication (i.e. measuring impacts 
of changes in exchange rates in tariffs). The table below shows that for 20% devaluation, China 
bound and applied average tariffs increase dramatically, which can be regarded as increased 
tariff for imported products. 
Tariffs China 
Simple average bound rates (2009) 
Adjusted simple average bound rates 
10% 
32% 
Simple average MFN applied rates (2009) 
Adjusted simple average MFN applied rates 
9.6% 
31.5% 
Trade weighted average applied rates (2008) 
Adjusted trade weighted average applied rates 
4.3% 
25.2% 
Source: Tariff Profile WTO. Elaborated by CGTI cited in Throstensen et al (2011) 
As serious as it is, why currency rules remain absent in WTO framework? The following 
discussion will highlight how complex organisational capacities of WTO and IMF would 
undermine such enforcement. 
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Currency Manipulation: Whose Roles, WTO or IMF? 
The simple answer to above question would be “both or none”, depending on the perspective of 
looking at the extent of responsibility, either taken as partially or wholly. As have been 
mentioned earlier, currency manipulation is not merely for boosting exports, but also for various 
reasons, thus if the currency rules are put in WTO, it will overload the scope of WTO. In this case, 
at present WTO does not have mandate to justify any currency manipulation though it has 
potential capacity to enforce such rules as its dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) functions 
very well when it comes to punishment and retaliation from such practices. On the other hand, 
IMF, as a monetary institution, has been given explicit mandate to oversee exchange rate 
policies of its member states; nonetheless, it lacks capacity to enforce if any country is proven to 
manipulate their currency. This discrepancy is argued to be one of the reasons why currency 
manipulation proliferated over the years. 
The reason why this is the case could be traced back to the history of establishment of 
international organisations during the Bretton Woods system. The Bretton Woods system, 
created in 1944 originally consists of three organisations, IMF –dealt with monetary practices, 
the Bank for International Reconstruction and Development, later expanded to the World Bank –
managed post-war reconstruction, and ITO –was intended to deal with international trade, but 
later replaced by GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) 1947 which become the basis 
of establishment of WTO in 1995. 
IMF, a monetary institution, has a mandate to regulate international financial system to become 
stable. It is argued that in the 1930s following the Great Depression, countries had resorted to 
currency devaluation to gain competitiveness for the purpose of stimulating exports 
(Thorstensen, Muller and Ramos 2015). It is arguably true that principle of monetary sovereignty 
holds; which assumes that monetary policies remain in the hand of the national government, 
nonetheless as this will create global instability, countries decided to give in part of their 
monetary authority since they were afraid to losing out from other countries devaluation. During 
the Bretton Woods system (1946-71), IMF has mandate to supervise fixed parity exchange rate 
system, i.e. value of a currency was defined in terms of US dollar and US dollar was defined in 
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terms of gold; this fixed exchange rate could not be changed by more than 10% without IMF’s 
consent (Sanford 2011). 
IMF, despite its monetary focus, has other basic goals which include the promotion of world 
growth and balanced international trade. It also says explicitly in its articles with regard to 
currency manipulation that affects international trade, in article IV(1)(iii) it says: “…Each member 
shall avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system in order to 
prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage 
over other members.” 
IMF article IV(3) also indicates Fund’s mandate to oversee exchange rate of the member states: 
a) “The Fund shall oversee the international monetary system in order to ensure its effective 
operation, and shall oversee the compliance of each member with its obligations under Section 1 
of this Article. 
(b)…The Fund shall exercise firm surveillance over the exchange rate policies of members, and 
shall adopt specific principles for the guidance of all members with respect to those policies…” 
It is explicit from the above article that currency-related trade policies are the mandate of IMF, 
nonetheless, although IMF can “exercise firm surveillance”, it cannot force the country to change 
its exchange rate as the countries can get away and claim that their exchange rate policies are 
not in violation of article IV, but only to stabilise their domestic economy (Sanford 2011), which 
can be translated indirectly as confirming IMF basic goal i.e. promotion of world growth. 
Eventually, it lacks capacity for such punishment and can only provide a space for multilateral 
consultation among its member states where other member states urged currency manipulators 
to compel to article IV; yet, in the end, monetary authority remains in the hand of the country 
alone (Sanford 2011). 
GATT was drafted when Bretton Woods system operates and while IMF mandate to oversee the 
fixed exchange rate regime was in force. As such, currency manipulation would not be a major 
concern of GATT, thus, only few GATT articles dealt with exchange rates and trade, mainly article 
XV. 
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Article XV(4): Contracting parties shall not, by exchange action, frustrate the intent of the 
provisions of this Agreement, nor, by trade action, the intent of the provisions of the Articles of 
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. 
Yet, there has been no example in WTO of the application of article XV(4) as when a member 
states questions another member’s exchange rate policies, it would be a time-consuming 
process and demands establishment for panel for its conclusion (Thorstensen et al 2011). 
Moreover, Denters (2003) argued that the problem with GATT article XV lies in what is 
considered as ‘exchange action’. The IMF Article of Agreement stipulated that exchange action 
differs from exchange-rate policies. Exchange actions or exchange policies according to IMF are 
defined as the obligation of IMF members not to restrict exchange of local currency into other 
members’ currencies. He quoted for the China case, it means that Chinese importers have the 
right to exchange Chinese yuan for other currencies required to purchase such goods. In this 
case, currency manipulation is not included as a part of exchange action, but rather exchange-
rate policies. As such, WTO remains silent in currency manipulation in affecting international 
trade. 
Then, what about WTO rules on subsidy and tariff, as currency manipulation would mean a 
double-edged protection, a tariff and subsidy at the same time. Article II(6) mentioned that tariff 
should be expressed in the appropriate currency value, but it does not extend beyond currency 
manipulation. 
Article II(6): Each contracting party shall accord to the commerce of the other contracting parties 
treatment …a) The specific duties and charges…maintained by such contracting parties, are 
expressed in the appropriate currency at the par value accepted or provisionally recognized by 
the Fund at the date of this Agreement… 
In the realm of subsidy, most economists would agree that currency undervaluation operates in 
the same mechanism as subsidy as it means lower costs of local production relative to world 
prices thereby stimulate exports (Sanford 2011). Nonetheless, the rules of subsidy in WTO do 
not regard currency manipulation as a form of subsidy. The term subsidy in WTO definitions only 
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contains (i) a financial contribution (ii) by a government or any public body within the territory of 
a Member (iii) which confers a benefit. 
Based on the above articles, it can be inferred that WTO does not have clear mandate in 
overseeing countries’ currency policies, though they significantly affect trade. It has appeared 
that all articles seem to reiterate the role of IMF to deal with such matter i.e. demanding WTO 
consultation with IMF. This is why currency-relate trade policies will remain absent in WTO, as 
raising this issue inside WTO would signify an “infringement of the concerted code of silence” 
(Throstensen et al 2011). GATT article XV(2) mentioned the need of IMF consultation explicitly: 
“In all cases in which the CONTRACTING PARTIES are called upon to consider or deal with 
problems concerning monetary reserves, balances of payments or foreign exchange 
arrangements, they shall consult fully with the International Monetary Fund. In such 
consultations, the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall accept all findings of statistical and other facts 
presented by the Fund…” 
The problem then arises on how IMF decides on the matter of currency manipulation. First, it 
does not have enforcement mechanism which means country will be able to get away from such 
infringement and second, it decides the issue in a political way through an agreement amongst 
the most influential parties, unlike WTO which decides by consensus (Throstensen et al 2011). It 
then may create a potential bias in favour of those who have more voting power. In China’s 
currency manipulation case for instance, IMF reluctance to intervene in China currency policies, 
though it is really apparent that China manipulated its currency, is a proximate manifestation of 
“leverage and legitimacy” (Mattoo and Subramanian 2008). IMF would not be legitimate and 
influential without a leverage of financing; thus IMF has not been successful to change domestic 
policies of its large creditor countries as it means that it will potentially lose significant amount of 
financing from these countries. In this case, China has become one of major creditor for IMF, 
thus there is a tendency that the Fund become “soft” to China (Mattoo and Subramanian 2008). 
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Reinforcement of status quo? 
This section will explore on the possibility of reinforcement of status quo regarding currency-
related trade policies. As have been discussed earlier, complex institutional constraints between 
WTO and IMF would let currency manipulators slip in easily to manipulate their currencies, 
which ultimately hurt their trading partners. The following discussion will rely on neorealism 
framework to analyse power relations between member states in WTO and IMF and determine 
that the possibility of inclusion of currency chapter in WTO will remain unlikely so does the 
possibility of constructing enforcement mechanism in IMF. 
Neoliberals, the opposite of neorealists, view that international institution has an ultimate power 
over its member states, while neorealists tend to view that its member states’ powers determine 
how the institution operates. According to Keohane (1990 as cited in Steinberg 1995), 
neoliberals tend to believe that institution offers positive-sum outcome to its member states by 
reducing transaction costs and minimising uncertainty which would otherwise hinder 
international cooperation. In this case, all member states will gain by integrating themselves to 
such institution. In contrast, neorealists show that “the greatest power-fights about international 
institutions are not solving market failures, but about distributional consequences of particular 
institutional structure or law” (Steinberg 1995). Neorealists also view that international 
institution is seen as “brutal arena” where its member states tend to look for possibility of taking 
advantage of each other and also have minimal tendency to trust each other (Mearsheimer 
1995). 
Based on the above theories, this paper believe that neorealist framework will better fit the 
explanation on how power relations in IMF and WTO operates, where decision-making processes 
reflect power fights between member states to maintain their national interests. In the case of 
currency-related trade policies, there has been push from academia, as well as diplomats and 
trade lawyers and about the danger of currency manipulation. There are three alternatives being 
proposed (1) inclusion of currency chapter in WTO (2) setting up strong enforcement mechanism 
in IMF (3) strengthening the coordination between WTO and IMF. Nonetheless, none of these 
will be likely to be realised if we examine the voting power in WTO and IMF according to 
neorealism framework. 
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First alternative, the inclusion of currency chapter in WTO will demand its member states to 
agree upon such issue. Nonetheless, the consensus-based decision making of WTO, where all 
member have to agree on certain issues, will inhibit such inclusion as currency manipulators will 
be more likely to object such inclusion. This confirms neorealists view on how member states will 
look for opportunities to take advantage over each other through beggar-thy-neighbour policies, 
which in this case is currency manipulation. Second option, an attempt to build strong 
enforcement capacity for IMF will likely produce the same result, though it does not require a 
consensus, it will still require 85% of voting power depending on members’ contribution toward 
the Fund. Considering Gagnon (2012) research on extreme manipulators, this paper has 
simulated the likely result for such proposal. Assuming all extreme manipulators object for such 
amendment, they will take up almost 24%1 of IMF voting power, which eventually cancel out 
such proposal to take place. The last alternative will be much more complex as coordination 
requires consultation from both organisations. Thus such coordination demands voting from 
both institutions, and assuming currency manipulators would object, it will likely operate in the 
same mechanism like the other two alternatives. Bergsten (2014) argued that IMF and WTO 
have frequently discussed for better coordination and set up mechanisms to promote, but it only 
has minimal effect. For instance, IMF staff vetoed for “inclusion of currency considerations in 
China’s protocol of accession to the WTO on the grounds that such a provision was within the 
jurisdiction of IMF rather than WTO” (Bergsten 2014). 
Where to address currency manipulation? 
Considering that the status quo in both WTO and IMF is likely to remain, the question is how to 
address the problem with currency manipulation which distorts global trade? This will require 
cooperation among the nations to agree on such deal. This could be framed within neorealists’ 
argument on cooperation. Mearsheimer (1995) argued that though realist world is competitive 
in nature, certain level of cooperation between states is possible although it is difficult to achieve 
and sustain; it depends on two factors, relative-gains considerations and concern about 
cheating. 
                                                          
1 As per 2011 see https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx 
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As multilateral governance fails to provide such possibility of inclusion, an alternative has to be in 
the form of free-trade agreements among nations. One plausible example would be The Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) as it is beyond the coverage of IMF and WTO. Currently, there are 
twelve countries participating in such negotiations; United States, Australia, New Zealand, 
Singapore, Japan, Malaysia, Brunei, Canada, Mexico, Chile, Peru and Vietnam. With regard to 
possibility of inclusion of currency chapter in TPP, opinions are divided into two; those who are 
sceptical and those who are optimistic for such inclusion. 
When the paper analyses this possibility based on the afore-mentioned two factors, relative 
gains considerations for such inclusion will ultimately be dependent on the bargaining between 
gaining market access from such agreements in the absence of currency manipulation vs. gains 
from manipulating currency considering others will manipulate their currencies as well. If the 
participants see that gains without currency manipulation will be greater, they will likely to 
accept for such currency chapter inclusion. The second factor, concern about cheating, will be 
solved by formulating a mechanism for severe penalty (i.e. termination or membership and 
retaliation by other countries). Building this mechanism will relatively be less complex in such 
free-trade agreement than in the multilateral sphere (i.e. WTO or IMF). 
The sceptical argument comes from Bernstein (2015) which frankly stated that six out of 12 
countries participating in the deal are currency manipulators. Thus, they will most likely object 
such inclusion. Vinik (2015) also argued that even the US will object for such inclusion as he 
expressed that “Much of the world thinks that the Federal Reserve manipulated the dollar 
through its quantitative easing programs, so any chapter on currency manipulation that could 
possibly receive approval from the 11 other TPP countries would have to put restrictions on the 
Fed—something the Obama administration would never agree to…” 
Nonetheless, this paper argued that there is some possibility of currency chapter in TPP deal. 
Adapting to neorealist framework, cooperation will be possible; if the gain from having a trade 
deal without any currency manipulation is greater than with the proliferation of currency 
manipulation, the member states will likely approve for such inclusion, regardless of their 
“currency manipulator” status. Johnson (2015) presented the positions of the countries 
participating in this deal. For instance, advanced economies with floating exchange rates such as 
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Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, do not encourage currency manipulation. Chile, with its 
sound macroeconomic policies would not favour currency manipulation. Mexico and Peru have 
been hurt by currency manipulators. Vietnam is more concerned with deal on labour rights thus 
will accept other deals without much objection. Brunei, a small economy, is unlikely to object as 
well. Meanwhile, Japan, Malaysia and Singapore, despite being labelled as currency 
manipulators, have been hurt by China, thus will much more likely to favour the inclusion of 
currency chapter (Bergsten 2014). United States, which has been hurt by other countries’ 
currency manipulation, will be likely the first to propose such inclusion. Last but not least, China 
is not currently participating in the TPP negotiations, thus the possibility of inclusion of currency 
chapter in TPP will become likely. 
Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to analyse why currency manipulation have not been addressed by 
WTO, though it may affect trade in the form of double-protection i.e. tariff for imports and 
subsidy for exports simultaneously. It is also dangerous for global trade-balance, as it distorts the 
trade under “effective” exchange-rates and has been classified as one of beggar-thy-neighbour 
policies. 
This paper has argued that complex mechanism on how WTO and IMF operate is the main culprit 
for such absence of currency rules. Currency policies are ultimately, under the jurisdiction of IMF 
yet the Fund does not have strong enforcement-mechanism to ensure that the countries will not 
resort to currency manipulation to boost their exports. On the other hand, WTO, with its well-
built dispute settlement mechanism, does not have mandate to oversee countries currency 
policies and have to resort to consultation with IMF. Ironically, IMF consultation will be biased 
toward most powerful IMF donors, which China (the greatest currency manipulator) has recently 
become one. 
This paper has explored the future possibility of addressing currency manipulation based on 
neorealism framework and conclude that any future multilateral negotiation (WTO and/or IMF) 
on strengthening the enforcement of rules on currency-related trade policies will only produce 
limited or even no result as decision making processes reflect power bargaining between 
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member states and currency manipulators are much likely to object such insertion. The 
possibility of currency chapter thus remains at the free-trade agreements level so long as 
participating countries decide that gain from trading without currency manipulation is greater 
than with the existence of manipulation and the enforcement mechanism is in place. 
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